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 When Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada in June 2016, three 
issues were reserved for further consideration during the mandatory parliamentary review 
originally scheduled to begin in June 2020 (but since delayed by COVID-19): requests for MAiD 
by mature minors, requests by patients for whom mental illness is the sole underlying medical 
condition, and advance requests in anticipation of incapacity.1  Action on each of these issues 
could result in expansion of the current eligibility criteria for MAiD.  I am concerned here only 
with the last of them, which I regard as the most complex and difficult.  
 There are two topics I will not be discussing: whether MAiD can, under appropriate 
conditions, be ethically justified and whether it should, under these conditions, be legally 
available.  I have dealt with both of these questions at length elsewhere and do not plan to reopen 
them here.2   In Canada legal access to MAiD is here to stay and enjoys widespread public 
support; any future changes in the law will almost certainly be in the direction of expanding its 
eligibility criteria or loosening its procedural safeguards.  One of those potential expansions is to 
allow MAiD to be accessed by means of a request made in advance of loss of decision-making 
capacity.
 In its current form the MAiD legislation does not permit such requests, since it stipulates 
that at the time at which the procedure is to be administered the patient must give “express 
consent” to receiving it.3  Since express consent presupposes decisional capacity, this 
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legislation, in December 2016 the government commissioned a report by the Council of 
Canadian Academies whose purpose was to summarize the evidence and issues concerning 
advance requests for MAiD, but not to make any recommendations.  That report was submitted 
in December 2018.4  Amendments to the legislation (Bill C-7), passed by Parliament in March 
2021, have opened the door slightly by allowing advance requests by patients after they have 
been approved for MAiD, if they fear losing capacity before the procedure can be administered.5  
But this provision applies only to patients whose natural death is deemed to be “reasonably 
foreseeable”, and continues to exclude (a) requests made after diagnosis of a “grievous and 
irremediable medical condition” but in advance of approval for MAiD, and (b) requests made 
before such a diagnosis.
 My aim here is twofold: to explore the ethical and legal issues concerning advance 
requests for MAiD, and to argue for expanding provision for such requests to include both of 
these further scenarios.  However, I will work toward these goals incrementally, beginning with 
some needed groundwork.  What follows in the next three sections is not intended to be in any 
way original or innovative.  It will be familiar territory for many readers, but is worth traversing 
because it is highly relevant to the further, and more contested, issues of advance directives and 
advance MAiD requests.
1.   The Doctrine of Informed Consent 
 It is now a firmly established legal and ethical principle that a competent person cannot 
be subjected to medical treatment without their informed consent.6  The classical doctrine 
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Decisional capacity.  Competence, or decisional capacity, is basically the ability to make a 
reasoned decision whether to accept or reject a particular form of treatment.  At the minimum it 
includes the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of both agreeing to 
and declining a treatment option.8  Decisional capacity is the default presumption for adult 
patients.  However, the presumption is rebuttable by evidence of a mental illness or disability 
serious enough to impair cognitive functioning.  Young children, on the other hand, will 
generally be presumed to be decisionally incapable, though there will of course be a grey area 
located somewhere during adolescence (so-called ‘mature minors’).  It is important to note that 
the relevant decisional capacity for informed consent is treatment-specific: it is the ability to 
make a reasoned decision concerning this treatment at this time by this practitioner.  A person 
may be competent to make other personal decisions (such as financial ones) but not treatment 
decisions, may be competent to make some treatment decisions but not others, and may be 
competent to make particular treatment decisions at some times and not others.
Consent.  Consent is likewise treatment-specific.  In some contexts, such as normal medical 
procedures during a routine checkup, tacit consent may be inferred from the mere fact that the 
patient has turned up for their appointment and is registering no objection to the examination.  
For more serious procedures, explicit consent will be necessary, preferably by means of a written 
consent form.  
Voluntariness.  The patient’s giving of consent must be free of undue influence and coercion, 
whether by providers or by family or friends.  It is recognized, of course, that our decision-
making as patients will often be influenced by what others think or suggest or by our knowledge 
of what they want or would prefer.  Since it would aim much too high to purge decision-making 
of all such influences, the issue of voluntariness will turn on when such influences are ‘undue’—
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coercion.  As with decisional capacity, there will inevitably be borderline cases in which the 
voluntariness of patient consent to treatment is uncertain.
Information. The patient must be provided with adequate information concerning the treatment 
option in question.  This information will normally include the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis in 
the absence of treatment, the nature of each of the available treatment options, the probable 
outcome of each option, and the risks attached to each option.  The general rule for disclosure is 
that it should include all of the information which a reasonable person in this particular patient’s 
circumstances would need in order to make a reasoned decision concerning the treatment in 
question. 
2. Informed Refusal of Treatment 
 “The logical corollary of this doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally has 
the right not to consent, that is the right to refuse treatment and to ask that it cease where it has 
already been begun.”9  In fact, the relationship between consent and refusal is even closer than 
this talk of a ‘corollary’ suggests.  If consent is necessary for being treated, then, logically, 
absence of consent is sufficient for not being treated.  Since refusing treatment is the most 
emphatic way of withholding consent, the right of treatment refusal is an inextricable part of the 
doctrine of informed consent.10  While much medical treatment is routine, some is not.  At the 
extreme, where initiation or continuation of treatment is necessary in order to sustain life, refusal 
of treatment can become life-threatening.  Even in these cases, however, there is no real ethical 
or legal issue about the patient’s right of refusal.  It is well established in both ethics and law that 
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3. The Goals of Informed Consent
 Though the doctrine of informed consent (and refusal) is well established in both ethics 
and law, it is still appropriate to ask which goals or values it is meant to serve.  There are two 
obvious answers to this question—one, perhaps, more obvious than the other.  
Patient autonomy.  Since the doctrine puts the patient in charge of determining what may be 
done with their body, it obviously serves the value of autonomy.12  As I shall understand it, 
exercising autonomy (or self-determination) is a matter of managing one’s own life in 
accordance with one’s own values and priorities.  The concept of autonomy has received a great 
deal of attention (arguably too much attention) in recent decades, resulting in a bewildering array 
of competing analyses, many of which have little or nothing to do with the decision-making 
context of informed consent.  The more robust conceptions of autonomy can require 
sophisticated capacities—for rational determination of the will or a high level of critical self-
reflection—which no informed consent protocol demands.  Under these interpretations most of 
us probably fail to be autonomous most of the time, and this will include patients making 
decisions about medical treatment.  We can, with greater expectation of success, aim to ensure 
that these decisions are made in accordance with our own life goals and values.  For the purposes 
of this discussion, that will suffice for being autonomous.  
 Autonomy therefore requires being the one who makes the major decisions about how 
their life is to go: what educational and career path to pursue, where to live, whether and whom 
to marry, whether to have children, how to spend leisure time, what social/political causes to 
support, and so on.  The presumptive point of the requirement of informed consent is to provide 
us with the same managerial opportunity with respect to our health care.  While many treatment 
decisions will be relatively trivial, some will have a profound impact on the course of our lives.  
In theory at least, the regime of informed consent is meant to ensure that no treatment goes 
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forward unless or until we have signed off on it.  No one else gets to make that final decision, no 
one else gets to determine how our therapeutic process will go—only we do.
Patient interest.  While self-determination may be valuable in its own right—most of us want to 
be masters of our fate and captains of our soul—it is also an effective means whereby we are 
enabled to pursue our own best interest.  A decisionally capable and well-informed agent is 
normally in a better position to act in their best interest than is any third party.  Giving the agent 
final authority over their health-care decisions will then be an effective way of ensuring that 
those decisions are guided by their own interest and not by anyone else’s.  
 Patient autonomy and patient interest will normally run together as the two justifying 
values of the doctrine of informed consent.  Normally, but not necessarily.  Free and fully 
informed self-determiners who surpass the threshold of decisional capacity are nonetheless 
capable of making decisions to their own detriment.  Devout Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, 
may decline blood transfusions even when they are necessary to sustain life.  In cases like this the 
twin justifying values of the doctrine may come apart: respecting autonomy will require 
acquiescence in the patient’s decision while promoting patient interest may urge disregarding it.  
When this happens the doctrine tends to side with autonomy against interest: as long as the 
patient in question is decisionally capable, fully informed, and free of the undue influence of 
others then in the absence of consent no treatment may be administered, whatever the adverse 
impact of nontreatment might be. 
4. Advance Directives
 The doctrine of informed consent (and refusal) applies in the first instance to decisions 
that are contemporaneous with the treatment in question.  But decisions by capable individuals 
can also be made in advance.  Should you lose capacity at some stage of your life and require 
medical attention, you will not at that time be able to manage your own treatment decisions.  
Someone else will have to decide for you, in light either of (what they take to be) your wishes or 
(what they take to be) your best interest.  However, at an earlier stage of life, when you are still 
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capable, you may anticipate that you might later find yourself in this condition.  If you wish to be 
able to exercise some degree of control over your later treatment then the obvious mechanism is 
to register your treatment decisions in advance, ideally in a written instrument.  These will be 
now-for-then decisions, as opposed to the normal contemporaneous now-for-now decisions.  But 
because they are made by a decisionally capable person, though applicable only in the event of 
incapacity, they will still count as the exercise of (diachronic rather than synchronic) autonomy 
or self-determination.
 There are two types of instrument available for advance care planning.13  Instruction 
directives (also known as living wills) allow persons to stipulate which modes of treatment they 
accept, and which they reject, in various possible future scenarios.  In effect, they provide the 
opportunity to register now the decisions the person would make then, if capable of doing so.  
These directives can, and often do, include decisions to accept or reject life-sustaining treatment 
in the event of a life-threatening condition.14  Proxy directives (also known as durable powers of 
attorney) appoint someone else to serve as substitute decision-maker (SDM) for the (later) 
incapacitated patient.  Most advance directives include both types of instrument, in which case 
treatment decisions for the incapacitated patient are to be made by whomever the patient has 
designated in advance as their proxy, and they should be made on the basis of the patient’s 
advance instructions.15
 So understood, advance directives are a logical extension of the doctrine of informed 
consent and refusal.  Just as the requirement of informed consent safeguards the individual’s 
autonomy in contemporaneous treatment (or nontreatment) decisions, so the requirement that 
advance directives be respected safeguards the individual’s autonomy over such decisions at later 
stages of their life.  Furthermore, if we continue to assume that autonomous individuals are 
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decisions registered in advance will have the added justification that it is also protective of 
patient well-being.  This model of advance care planning therefore appears to provide a 
straightforward means whereby formerly competent patients may exercise some degree of control 
over their end-of-life care.  That control can take the form either of requesting or refusing 
familiar modes of treatment: resuscitation, tube feeding, ventilation, administration of antibiotics, 
sedation, and so on.
 All of this seems straightforward.  Sadly, it is not.  Critics have raised a number of 
concerns about reliance on advance directives for decision-making on behalf of incapacitated 
patients.  Some of these concerns turn on issues that are specific to one particular kind of 
incapacity— advanced dementia—and I will come to them later (section 7).  But others are 
broader in scope, challenging the efficacy of advance care planning in general, and I will deal 
with them first.  
 Over the past four decades Rebecca Dresser has been the most persistent critic of advance 
directives.16  Most of her objections have been broadly practical in nature, pointing to various 
respects in which advance treatment decisions are less reliable than contemporaneous ones as 
expressions of patient self-determination.  Although she does not sort them in this way, I will 
divide the issues she has raised into two categories: problems of information and problems of 
specificity.    
 The informational deficiencies of advance directives are best appreciated by contrasting 
them with contemporaneous care decisions, where the patient can (and must) be provided with 
all of the information a reasonable person in their circumstances would need in order to make a 
reasoned decision concerning the treatment in question.  This process requires communication, 
preferably face to face, between the patient and their health care providers, with the attendant 
opportunity for both questioning and discussion.  Furthermore, it must be emphasized again that 
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as full and detailed as the patient requires and the circumstances permit.  In principle at least, 
contemporaneous decision-making can live up to the highest ideals of informed choice.
 Contrast this rosy picture with treatment decisions made years, even decades, before the 
onset of incapacity and the need for treatment.  Not only are there many types, and degrees, of 
incapacity, there are even more conditions for which an incapacitated patient might require life-
sustaining treatment.  To try to anticipate all of these future contingencies and make an informed 
treatment decision about each of them is a practical impossibility.  Some possible scenarios can, 
of course, be discussed in advance as hypotheticals, but doing so is far less informative than a 
specific treatment consultation.  Contemporaneous decision-making also has the advantage that 
the information provided is up to date.  While it may not be possible to anticipate further 
discoveries or treatment modalities that would be relevant to the patient’s decision, at least the 
current state of both knowledge and art can be fully communicated.  By contrast, treatment 
decisions registered far in advance might be rendered obsolete or redundant by subsequent 
medical developments.  Even if these decisions were as informed as possible then, they may not 
reflect the options available to the incapacitated patient now.  For that reason they also may not 
reflect the informed choices the patient would make now, were they capable of such choices.
 The informational deficiencies canvassed in the previous paragraph are all factual in 
nature.  But it is equally possible for a person’s values to shift with the passage of time, so that a 
decision autonomously made earlier in one’s life ceases to have that status later.  Advance 
directives can, of course, be modified, or revoked entirely, in response to changes of heart.  But 
for various practical reasons this may not happen, with the result that the treatment decisions 
recorded in the written directive are now uninformed, not about factual matters, but about the 
subject’s own preferences.  Furthermore, it is often difficult, or even impossible, to anticipate in 
advance what it would be like to be in the various conditions for which one is trying to plan.  As 
an active able-bodied person you might imagine full body paralysis, or ‘locked-in’ syndrome, to 
be unendurable.  When it occurs you might discover that it still makes a meaningful life possible, 
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but if you are unable to communicate treatment decisions at the time you might find yourself 
bound by your own earlier, uninformed, preferences.
 The specificity problem for advance directives is a corollary of the foregoing 
informational impediments.  Whereas contemporaneous consent or refusal is specific as to both 
treatment and occasion, advance instructions must attempt to anticipate a wide variety of 
treatment options and circumstances.  While one might attempt to respond to each of these 
possible scenarios with detailed and precise directions concerning forms of treatment to be 
administered or withheld, there is a strong tendency toward broader and more general directions 
such as ‘No resuscitation if I become terminally ill’ or ‘No life-sustaining measures whose 
burdens would outweigh their benefits’.  Instructions as vague as these cannot be applied 
mechanically to later treatment decisions and therefore require interpretation both by SDMs and 
by providers.  Indeed, instruction directives can be vaguer still, simply recording the subject’s 
values or priorities for their life: ‘I believe that life should have dignity’ or ‘I don’t want to be too 
much of a burden on others’.  In these cases advance directives lose much of their utility in 
determining treatment decisions for incapacitated patients.
 Deficiencies of information and specificity can pose serious challenges to reliance on 
advance directives for decision-making on behalf of incapacitated patients, especially in end-of-
life contexts.  But these problems are not sufficient to entirely negate the value of such 
instruments.17  Even a vaguely worded directive provides some insight into a person’s deeply 
held values and their goals for the end-stage of their life.  If our aim is to respect a person’s 
autonomy over their treatment decisions then a written directive must still be given serious 
weight.  At the same time, the reasons for relying on a directive must also be rebuttable—by 
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5. Advance Requests for MAiD        
 As noted above, advance directives frequently take the form of selective refusal of 
various life-sustaining procedures, including in circumstances where such refusal will (probably 
or even certainly) have the effect of hastening death.  However, they could also be used to 
request forms of end-of-life treatment, such as MAiD, which will also have the effect of 
hastening death.  From this point on, the argument of this paper will focus exclusively on 
advance requests for MAiD, under the following definition: “a request for MAiD, created in 
advance of a loss of decision-making capacity, intended to be acted upon under circumstances 
outlined in the request after the person has lost decisional capacity”.18
 I have argued elsewhere that, when all other relevant factors are equal, there is no 
significant ethical difference between refusing life-sustaining treatment and requesting MAiD.19  
But that argument raises an important question: when are all other relevant factors equal?
 Not always.  MAiD has two key characteristics: (1) its administration will hasten death 
with certainty, and (2) it is requested for that reason, i.e. because the patient wishes to hasten 
their death.  Not all refusals of life-sustaining treatment share the same characteristics.  A cancer 
patient may decline further aggressive treatment, settling instead for palliative care, because the 
treatment has only a limited chance of long-term success and they find its side effects unbearable.  
Both the patient and their providers may expect the refusal to shorten life, but it may not turn out 
to do so: spontaneous remission may occur.  More importantly, the treatment is not refused 
because the patient wishes to hasten death; if remission does occur, they will gratefully accept 
the further months or years of life.  So we need to look elsewhere for instances in which all other 
relevant factors (besides the bare difference of request v. refusal) really are equal. 
 One such instance is the case of Nancy B., a twenty-five-year-old woman suffering from  
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ventilator.20  Her intellectual capacity was unaffected by the disease.  After two and one-half 
years in this condition she requested removal of the respiratory support in order to escape the 
suffering caused by her immobility.  With the ventilator she could potentially have lived on for 
several years; without it she would die quickly.  While her decision was not opposed either by 
her health care providers or by the hospital, it was unclear whether under Canadian law 
disconnecting her from the ventilator would constitute criminal negligence causing death (a 
culpable homicide).  Justice Dufour, who heard the case in the Quebec Superior Court, affirmed 
Nancy B.’s legal right to refuse continued use of the ventilator, even though such refusal would 
precipitate her death.  Five weeks after the judgement, her attending physician induced Nancy B. 
into a coma and removed the ventilator; she died comfortably in her sleep.  Nancy B.’s refusal of 
further use of the ventilator clearly hastened her death,21 and she refused it for that very reason.  
From an ethical standpoint there is no material difference between her refusing treatment, on the 
one hand, and requesting MAiD, on the other.22 
 Nancy B.’s decision to request removal of the ventilator was contemporaneous and not 
registered in an advance directive (though it is easy to imagine her executing such a directive to 
be acted on in the event of later incapacity).  Furthermore, there does remain in her case the bare 
difference between actively causing her death (by MAiD) and allowing her to die of her illness 
(by removing the ventilator), and some might think that this ‘doing/allowing’ distinction itself 
makes an ethical difference even if all other relevant factors are equal.23  In that case, it is 
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 Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking (VSED) is the decision by a capable patient to 
refuse all food and fluids, whether administered via a feeding tube or by mouth.24  A patient’s 
right to refuse a feeding tube, or to demand its withdrawal, is beyond ethical or legal question, 
since the insertion of such a tube is a form of medical treatment.  But patients have an equal right 
to decline food and fluids administered by mouth, even if this form of feeding constitutes basic 
or personal care rather than health care.25  To put the matter bluntly, patients may not be force-
fed.  VSED provides a legal means for patients to hasten their death, if MAiD is not available in 
their jurisdiction or if they do not qualify for it.  Those who elect this route, and carry it through, 
will ultimately die of dehydration, usually in 7-10 days.  In this case the final possible ethical 
difference from MAiD vanishes: like MAiD, VSED itself hastens death, rather than merely 
allowing it to happen, and, again like MAiD, it is chosen for this reason.  VSED and MAiD are 
different routes to the same destination.26
 When the patient is capable, then the decision to pursue VSED is contemporaneous 
(though capacity may be lost during the process).  But the refusal of oral feeding can also be 
embedded in an advance directive (in which case this becomes Stopping Eating and Drinking by 
Advance Directive, or SED by AD).27  There are various forms of oral intake that can be 
restricted, or refused outright, in an advance directive, but for the purposes of this discussion I 
will assume that the person, while capable, has indicated refusal of all assisted feeding (by all 
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of, and has the same ethical and legal authority as, an advance directive refusing life-sustaining 
medical treatment.  Since there is no significant ethical difference between VSED and MAiD, 
there is also no difference between SED by AD and advance requests for MAiD.  The reasons for 
respecting the former apply equally to the latter.
    There is, therefore, a strong ethical case for permitting advance requests for MAiD.  The 
argument thus far has taken the form of a plea for consistency: since we already accord ethical 
and legal authority to advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment (including SED by AD), it 
would be arbitrary to deny the same authority to advance MAiD requests.  But advance requests 
can also be given a more positive and constructive justification by showing how they further 
serve the goals of informed consent, and of MAiD itself:
Patient autonomy.  Like advance directives in general, advance MAiD requests enable persons, 
while capable, to extend their autonomy over their end-of-life treatment decisions to a possible 
future time of incapacity.
Patient interest.  Like advance refusals of treatment, advance MAiD requests enable 
incapacitated persons to escape from living conditions which, while capable, they determined 
would be intolerable for them.  
Preservation of life.  Denying a patient in the early stages of a progressive degenerative illness 
such as Alzheimer’s the option of an advance MAiD request, to be acted upon in the event of 
later incapacity, can have the perverse effect of leading them to seek MAiD, while still capable, 
sooner than they would otherwise wish, thereby foregoing some further weeks or months of 
quality of life.28  This consideration weighed heavily with the Supreme Court in its Carter 
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Peace of mind.  Experience has already shown that patients approved for MAiD can benefit 
therapeutically just from the assurance that the option will be there for them when they need it.30  
Having in place an advance request that they know will be acted on when needed can provide the 
same comfort.31 
 In light of the foregoing considerations, it is not surprising that the Provincial-Territorial 
Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying (2015) and the Special Joint Committee on 
Physician-Assisted Dying (2016) both recommended that the impending MAiD legislation allow 
for advance requests,32 nor that there is such strong public support now for amending the 
legislation to allow for such requests.33  It is even less surprising against the background of an 
aging population, where the prevalence of such conditions as Alzheimer’s is expected to rise 
significantly over the next decade or so.34
 Making the ethical case for permitting advance MAiD requests is the easy part.  The 
harder task is to find workable solutions for the practical problems that will inevitably arise in 
accommodating them within the existing MAiD legislation.  These problems are not simple and 
the best treatment of them is not always apparent.  However, in the course of working through 
them, in the sections to follow, it will be useful to keep in mind that we have already encountered 
every one of them in connection with advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment in general, and 
SED by AD in particular.  Finding similar solutions for advance MAiD requests should not 
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6. Loss of Capacity
  In principle, advance MAiD requests can anticipate a wide range of potential conditions 
of incapacity.  But the most common condition, and the one most commonly anticipated in 
advance directives, is dementia.  In addition to being a possible outcome of stroke or traumatic 
brain injury, this condition characterizes the end state of a number of diseases, including 
Huntington’s and Parkinson’s.  But 60-70% of all dementia cases in Canada have a different 
cause: Alzheimer’s disease.  In what follows I will focus primarily on advance requests for 
MAiD that are executed in anticipation of late-stage Alzheimer’s.  This scenario can be adapted, 
where necessary, to fit the other circumstances resulting in severe dementia.
 Alzheimer’s is an incurable progressive neurodegenerative disorder that gradually erodes 
cognitive, executive, and motor functioning.35  The disease progression may be relatively rapid 
(over a year or so) or quite slow (over decades).  Normal life expectancy following diagnosis is 
3-9 years.  The early symptoms are relatively mild, chiefly characterized by decreasing ability to 
retain newly learned information and by problems with language, including diminished 
vocabulary.  As the disease progresses, patients will experience confusion or disorientation and 
gradually lose the ability to carry out tasks, to the point where they will eventually be unable to 
care for themselves or make simple decisions.  In the later stages patients are likely to manifest 
psychiatric symptoms and behavioural disturbances, including mood swings, anxiety, fear, 
agitation, anger, outbursts of aggression, and paranoid delusions about family members, whom 
they are no longer able to recognize.  Both language and motor skills will further deteriorate, to 
the point at which the patient will lose all ability to communicate and will be bedridden and 
incontinent.  At this stage the patient is also likely to suffer due to pain, difficulty in breathing, 
agitation, ulcers, fever, and malnutrition.  The immediate cause of death will often be infection or 
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gradually be lost over the course of the disease.  Because the progression of symptoms is gradual, 
there will be no bright line between capacity and incapacity.  But incapacity is the inevitable 
outcome.
 Palliative measures are, of course, available for many of the distressing symptoms of late-
stage Alzheimer’s.  However, one study of these symptoms reached the following rather 
discouraging conclusion:36  
A policy of deliberate euthanasia could be used to end suffering, but this is considered 
unacceptable by most caregivers and medical staff and is prohibited by law in most 
countries.  A different approach is to encourage more aggressive palliative medical and 
nursing care to prevent malnutrition, decubitus ulcers, infections, and other disorders 
which can be treated in special units for patients with higher levels of suffering.  We 
believe that lower levels of suffering in end-stage dementia patients can be achieved, at 
least in part, by better medical and nursing treatment.  This still needs to be proven by 
further research, because it is not clear to what extent suffering can be eased and whether 
this is possible at all.
The same study found that 63% of end-stage dementia patients die with “a high level of 
suffering” and only 7% with a low level. 
 By any reasonable measure, then, Alzheimer’s is a terrible disease and, ultimately, a 
terrible way to die.  It is easy to understand, therefore, why someone diagnosed with the disease 
would want to take steps to avoid its later ravages while still competent to do so.  It is equally 
easy to understand why someone might want to take similar steps in advance of diagnosis, 
especially if they have reason to believe—perhaps in light of family history—that they are 
particularly at risk of it.37  Furthermore, persons in the later stages of Alzheimer’s will easily 
satisfy two of the MAiD eligibility conditions for having a “grievous and irremediable medical 
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state of irreversible decline in capability”.38  For what it is worth, since Alzheimer’s is invariably 
fatal they may also satisfy the condition that “their natural death has become reasonably 
foreseeable”.  As far as the remaining condition is concerned, determining whether/when the 
suffering of a late-stage Alzheimer’s patient is “intolerable to them and ... cannot be relieved 
under conditions that they consider acceptable” is complicated by the patient’s inability to 
communicate at that point.  I will return to this issue later (sections 10-12).  However, it is clear 
that, when viewed in advance from a position of capability, the symptoms of late-stage 
Alzheimer’s will appear to many people as intolerable and to be avoided by whatever means are 
available.  Once those symptoms are being experienced it will be too late to seek relief from 
them by requesting MAiD.  The only route to this means of escape would be via an advance 
request, either before or after diagnosis.  
 Advanced dementia is not the only possible future condition of incapacity for which a 
person may wish to request MAiD: irreversible unconsciousness is another.  A permanent 
vegetative state (PVS) is a condition in which all ‘higher-brain’ functions (those supported by the 
cerebrum and especially the cortex) have ceased while ‘lower-brain’ (and especially brainstem) 
functions are still intact.  These differential outcomes can occur because the cerebrum is more 
sensitive than the brainstem to interruptions of circulation; a cutoff of oxygen supply to the brain 
of several minutes’ duration might damage the cerebrum beyond repair while allowing the 
brainstem to resume functioning once circulation has been restored.  PVS patients lack all 
capacity for cognitive functions, external awareness, and purposeful movement; however, they 
are usually capable of breathing on their own, without mechanical assistance, and can remain in 
this condition for many years as long as they are sustained by nutrition and hydration delivered 
through a feeding tube (since they are unable to swallow on their own). 
 It is now settled in Canadian law, as in most common law jurisdictions, that life-





Bill C-14, s. 241.2 (2).
vegetative state, on the basis of a prior refusal of such treatment.39  The effect of such removal is 
that the patient will die of dehydration, usually within a period of 7-10 days.  It would be entirely 
anomalous if it were possible for someone anticipating the possibility of PVS to elect a slow 
death by treatment refusal but not a quick one by a request for MAiD.  
7. MAiD and Dementia
 Earlier (section 4) I considered some of Rebecca Dresser’s criticisms of reliance on 
advance directives for decision-making for incapacitated patients, concluding that they were not 
sufficient to undermine the value and function of such directives.  Those criticisms—targeting 
deficits of information and specificity—applied across all scenarios of incapacity.  However, 
Dresser has also made further points specific to directives that anticipate incapacity due to 
advanced dementia.  To those I now turn.
 Many of her contributions on this issue have been in response to some arguments of 
Ronald Dworkin.  The context of these discussions was limited to patients with advance 
directives refusing life-sustaining treatment under stated conditions.  But the arguments on both 
sides of the issue apply equally to advance requests for MAiD.  The dialectic began with an 
example introduced and discussed by Dworkin:
When Andrew Firlik was a medical student, he met a fifty-four-year-old Alzheimer’s 
victim whom he called Margo, and he began to visit her daily in her apartment, where she 
was cared for by an attendant.  The apartment had many locks to keep Margo from 
slipping out at night and wandering in the park in a nightgown, which she had done 
before.  Margo said she knew who Firlik was each time he arrived, but she never used his 
name, and he suspected that this was just politeness.  She said she was reading mysteries, 
but Firlik “noticed that her place in the book jumps randomly from day to day; dozens of 
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humming to herself, rocking back and forth slowly, nodding off liberally, occasionally 
turning to a fresh page”.  Margo attended an art class for Alzheimer’s victims—they all, 
including her, painted pretty much the same picture every time, except near the end, just 
before death, when the pictures became more primitive.  Firlik was confused, he said, by 
the fact that “despite her illness, or maybe somehow because of it, Margo is undeniably 
one of the happiest people I have ever known.”  He reports, particularly, her pleasure at 
eating peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches.40
 Dworkin invites us to imagine that years before, when she was fully competent, Margo 
gave considerable thought to the overall course of her life and reached the settled conviction that 
she never wanted to live as a demented person; perhaps she regarded such a life, however happy 
it might be, as undignified or demeaning.  (If we wish, we can also imagine that Margo’s 
negative assessment of such a life was informed by her experience of her mother’s final years.)  
Acting on this conviction, she executed an instruction directive declining all life-sustaining 
treatment in the event that she should reach the advanced stages of Alzheimer’s.  Now she has 
acquired an infection easily treatable by antibiotics but fatal if left untreated.  Should her earlier 
refusal of treatment be respected, allowing her to die despite the evident fact that she is now quite 
happy?
 Dworkin contends that it should, on grounds of both Margo’s autonomy and her well-
being.  He argues that, due to her dementia, Margo is no longer capable of making autonomous 
decisions about how her life should go.  But she was once capable of such decisions—indeed, 
made just such a decision—and respect for her precedent autonomy requires doing now what she 
then directed.  Thus far, we might seem to have another case of conflict between patient 
autonomy and patient interest: respect for Margo’s prior autonomy will require us to do what is 
worse for her now, namely, allow her to die.  But Dworkin resists this construal of the situation, 
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 He supports this contention with a distinction between two types of interest, which he 
calls experiential and critical.  Our experiential interests consist of the pleasure or enjoyment we 
take in things that we do or that happen to us.  Margo has always had experiential interests and 
still does, since she gives every sign of enjoying her mystery book, her art class, and her peanut-
butter-and-jelly sandwiches.  Allowing her to die would be contrary to her current experiential 
interests.  Critical interests, on the other hand, are based on a person’s convictions of how their 
life should go and the goods it should contain.  Margo’s critical interests, Dworkin argues, were 
formed by her past convictions about the overall course of her life, including her wish not to 
finish it as a demented person.  Margo is now unable to form critical interests, Dworkin claims, 
since she now lacks the capacity to think about the overall course of her life, but she retains the 
critical interests she formed while previously competent.  Postponing her death by giving her 
life-sustaining treatment would be contrary to those interests.  Since Dworkin considers that, in 
case of conflict, critical interests should be given priority over experiential interests, he 
concludes that, all things considered, honouring Margo’s advance refusal would best serve her 
well-being (as well as her autonomy).
 Before proceeding further, we should note some pretty distinctive features of Dworkin’s 
Margo example.  First, from Firlik’s description it seems fairly clear that Margo has not yet 
reached late-stage Alzheimer’s: though her memory seems clearly impaired, her language skills 
are still intact, she is able to feed herself, and she has the motor skills necessary for painting (as 
well as wandering in the park).  Indeed, it is not even clear that Margo has entirely lost the 
capacity to make her own treatment decisions.  This is important because, in Dworkin’s 
imagining of the case, Margo’s refusal of life-sustaining treatment is to kick in when she has 
reached the advanced stages of Alzheimer’s.  So it might be premature to be considering whether 
to act on her advance instructions.  If Margo is indeed a late-stage Alzheimer’s patient then she is 
a very atypical one, and conclusions about her case may not apply to the more typical cases.  On 
the other hand, it might not matter that she is (atypically) happy, if (as Dworkin stipulates) her 
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aim in executing the directive was not to avoid later suffering but just to avoid living as a 
demented person.
 In any case, Dresser disagrees with Dworkin in two important respects.  First, she argues 
that there are special problems with an advance refusal of treatment by a (formerly) competent 
person which, if respected, would be contrary to the best interest of the (later) incompetent 
patient.  In such cases, she urges, the substitute decision-maker should attempt to make the  
treatment decision that is in the patient’s best interest.41  Thus, she rejects Dworkin’s contention 
that we are bound to respect Margo’s (precedent) autonomy.  Second, she argues that in applying 
the best interest standard only Margo’s current experiential interests should be considered, in 
which case the decision should be made to prolong her life, at least as long as she continues to be 
happy.  Clearly this second claim is crucial to her view, since if she were to acknowledge that 
Margo’s critical interests are also in play, then the best interest standard she favours might entail 
complying with Margo’s advance refusal of life-sustaining treatment.  Dresser puts her point in 
the following way: “Happy and contented Margo will experience clear harm from the decision 
that purports to advance the critical interests she no longer cares about.  This seems to me 
justification for a policy against...withholding effective, nonburdensome treatments, such as 
antibiotics, from dementia patients whose lives offer them the sorts of pleasures and satisfactions 
Margo enjoys.”42  
 The decision to withhold treatment will cause Margo “clear harm” only to her 
experiential interests.  Why, then, are we not also to consider her critical interests?  Dresser’s 
answer to this question is—and must be—that these interests no longer matter because “she no 
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If a patient can no longer appreciate the values that motivated the [advance] choice, 
treatment decisions should take into account what now matters to the patient.  When the 
capacity to appreciate critical interests is lost, experiential interests should take priority.  
Competent persons are free to elevate their critical interests above experiential interests.  
But after they lose decisional capacity, they have a different set of concerns.  Experiential 
interests become central to their lives.  Experiential interests should also be central to 
decisions about their life-sustaining treatment.43
In other words: if you are no longer capable of caring about your critical interests then those 
interests no longer matter.
 Dresser provides no real defence for this contention and it is difficult to see how it could 
be defended.  In an influential discussion, Agnieska Jaworska takes issue with Dresser on this 
very point:
The fact that the demented patient no longer affirms critical interests in no way implies 
that he does not have critical interests.  Since such interests are not inherently time-
specific, the prudential importance of satisfying them may survive the person’s 
unawareness of their satisfaction, whether due to unconsciousness, dementia, or even 
death.  Thus, a demented person who cannot generate contemporaneous critical interests 
may still have some of the same critical interests he professed when he was healthy.44
It is easy to see Jaworska’s point.  If you once accept Dworkin’s notion of critical interests—
which Dresser does—and if these interests include a person’s settled conviction about how the 
end-stage of their life should go, what reason could there be for discounting these interests 
simply because the person has later lost the capacity to endorse, or even understand, them?  It 
would be a different matter if, at some stage before or during the gradual onset of her dementia, 
Margo had reconsidered and disavowed her earlier disparagement of life in a demented 
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authoritative as an expression either of her autonomy or of her interests.  But we are to suppose 
that she neither rethought nor revoked her refusal of treatment when she was still capable of 
doing so.  Now that she has lost this capacity (as we are to assume), her earlier directions remain 
our only evidence of where her current critical interests lie.  Disregarding these interests because 
she has now lost the capacity to appreciate them would seem to undermine the whole point of 
advance care planning.  If I execute an instruction directive while capable then my aim in doing 
so is to direct my care when I later become incapable.  It would be perverse to disregard my 
earlier directive simply because I am now in the very condition of incapacity I anticipated in 
executing it in the first place.
 Dresser, however, has one more card to play.  The rationale behind advance care planning 
is based on the assumption that the (earlier) competent person who executes the directive is the 
same as the (later) incompetent person whose care it directs.  However, this assumption is open 
to question.  On the psychological view of personal identity, two person-stages belong to one and 
the same person if and only if enough relations of connectedness and continuity hold between 
their mental states (especially forward-looking connections such as intention and backward-
looking connections such as memory).45  However, it can be argued that in cases of severe 
dementia these connections fail to hold, since the later demented person is capable neither of 
carrying out any plans made by the earlier competent person nor of remembering anything about 
that person.  In that case, according to the psychological view, we may be dealing, not with 
different stages of the same person, but with two different persons.  Dresser then asks the 
obvious question: “...why should a patient who is now a different person be burdened by a 
treatment decision consistent with the former person’s preferences?  Compelling justification is 
lacking for according greater respect to the wishes of the earlier person (no longer in existence) 





See, for instance, Parfit 1984, sec. 78.
46
Dresser 1986, 381.  Cf. Dresser 1989, 157ff.  In a similar vein, see Walsh 2020.
 If we consider pre-demented Margo and now-demented Margo to be two different 
persons then there is surely no reason to think that decisions made by the former should have any 
authority over the latter.  This case against advance care planning—what David DeGrazia has 
nicely labelled ‘the someone else problem’—has been much discussed in the literature.47   This is 
not the place to summarize all of the argumentative moves that have been made to date, but I 
think it is pretty clear by now that the case has not been satisfactorily made out.48  For one thing, 
not everyone is persuaded that the psychological account of personal identity is correct, and at 
least some rival accounts will not support the conclusion that the two Margos are numerically 
distinct.49  It would seem foolhardy to let the fate of advance directives for dementia turn on the 
outcome of a contest between rival metaphysical theories.  For another, even on the 
psychological view there may be enough continuity between the two Margos to consider them 
the same person, especially if the onset of dementia is slow and gradual.50  Finally, the 
implications that Dresser attempts to draw from the psychological account, if taken literally, are 
massively counterintuitive.51  Margo’s daughter, who (let us say) is now her SDM, does not 
really doubt that this woman who is reading her book and enjoying her sandwiches is the same 
woman who was born in Vancouver in 1931, grew up in Montreal, married at the age of twenty-
seven, had three children, etc.  If she is mistaken on this point, if this is not her mother, then why 
is she being accorded the status of substitute decision-maker, since she has no right to make such 
decisions on behalf of a stranger?  Furthermore, why is this Margo still being treated as the legal 
owner of that property in Nova Scotia and these investment certificates?  If the previous, 
competent Margo no longer exists, where did she go?  Did she die?  If so, why did no one notice?  
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 Philosophical theories of personal identity do not prevent families, friends, health care 
providers, hospitals, and courts from assuming continuity of identity between the previously 
competent person and the currently incapacitated one.  Perhaps in this instance it is better to fit 
theory to practice rather than the other way around.
 However this may be, the question remains: What should Margo’s medical providers do?  
If her advance directive refused life-sustaining treatment should they now withhold antibiotics 
and allow her to die of her infection?  Or if it requested MAiD should they now administer it?52  
Or should they, in either case, ignore her directive and keep her alive to enjoy her peanut butter-
and-jelly sandwiches?  Perhaps, like Dresser, we cannot imagine ourselves acting on either 
directive in the face of Margo’s current contentment with her (diminished) life.  Our reluctance 
to do so might just be perspectival error: we are confronted daily by Margo’s current experiential 
enjoyments, whereas her previous disparagement of the life she is now living seems barely 
visible in the distant past.  If we wish to give our reluctance some philosophical support then the 
obvious means would be to agree with Dresser in rejecting Dworkin’s privileging of critical over 
experiential interests.  As a general thesis, however, it is hard to see how one might argue that 
current pleasures and enjoyments, under conditions of diminished or nonexistent autonomy, 
always take precedence over previous, fully autonomous, expressions of one’s deepest and most 
enduring values.  
 It is well to keep in mind that Margo is the easiest case for Dresser’s rejection of advance 
directives and the hardest case for Dworkin’s defence of them.  Mid-stage Alzheimer’s is seldom 
as rosy as Margo’s day-to-day experience, and the end-stages of the disease never are.  As noted 
earlier, as patients slide further and further into dementia it is far more common for their lives to 
be marked by increased suffering.  In these cases current experiential interests no longer speak so 
unequivocally in favour of prolonging life, and the case for acting on an advance refusal/request 
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dementia, Dresser would have to contend that we could never have a sufficient reason for 
honouring a directive, however distressed the person had become.  No such sweeping claim 
seems at all plausible. 
8. What Can We Learn from Other Jurisdictions?  
 If we wish to gain a sense of how advance MAiD requests might work in practice, we 
need to look abroad.  Worldwide, more than a dozen jurisdictions now make MAiD legally 
available (in one form or another), but only four (the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
Colombia) make any provision for advance requests.  In Belgium and Luxembourg MAiD can be 
administered, pursuant to an advance request, only in the case of irreversible unconsciousness 
(permanent vegetative state, or PVS), while little or no information is available concerning the 
disposition of advance MAiD requests in Colombia.  Only in the Netherlands can MAiD be 
administered in cases of advanced dementia; therefore, virtually all of the information we have 
about the practice in that context comes from that jurisdiction.
 MAiD became legal in the Netherlands under the Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2002.53  In order to conform to the ‘due care 
criteria’ specified in the Act a physician must:
a. be satisfied that the patient’s request is voluntary and well-considered;
b. be satisfied that the patient’s suffering is unbearable, with no prospect of improvement;
c. have informed the patient about his situation and prognosis;
d. have come to the conclusion, together with the patient, that there is no reasonable 
alternative in the patient’s situation;
e. have consulted at least one other, independent physician, who must see the patient and 







f. have exercised due medical care and attention in terminating the patient’s life or 
assisting in his suicide.54
 The Act includes a provision that written advance requests for MAiD can be prepared by 
anyone aged sixteen years or older.55  In the case of MAiD administered pursuant to an advance 
request, the due care criteria are to be followed “mutatis mutandis” (i.e., to the greatest extent 
possible in the given situation).56  However, although advance MAiD requests have been legally 
permitted in the Netherlands since 2002, very few have actually been implemented.  One survey 
of physicians, many of whose elderly patients had registered advance requests, found that MAiD 
ended up being administered only rarely, and never in patients deemed to be incapable.57   More 
recently, a study of the annual reports of the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees from 2002 
to 2017 found that “all or most of the patients who received euthanasia due to suffering caused 
by dementia were in the initial stages of the disorder and still had decisional capacity”.58  Only 
sixteen cases fell outside this category, and of them only six concerned patients who (a) received 
MAiD as a result of a written advance request and (b) were registered by the Regional Review 
Committee as decisionally incapable.59  Five of those six patients had Alzheimer’s, while the 
sixth was simply recorded as suffering from dementia.  Overall, the Review Committees found 
that the due care criteria had been complied with in all but four of the sixteen cases.  These four 
cases were referred to the Public Prosecution Service.60
 Two of these cases merit some attention for the issues they raise, not just for the 
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would allow advance requests for MAiD to be implemented for patients with dementia who have 
lost decisional capacity.
9. “Voluntary and Well-considered Request”
 The MAiD regime in the Netherlands attaches a great deal of importance to personal 
autonomy.  It is therefore foundational that MAiD can be administered only in case of a fully 
voluntary and informed request by a decisionally capable patient.  In normal circumstances this 
request is made at the time at which the procedure is to be carried out, or at least reaffirmed at 
that time.  In the case of an advance request, however, the conditions of decisional capacity, 
voluntariness, and information must be satisfied at the time that the written request is drawn up.  
That instrument will stipulate a later condition of incapacity—such as advanced dementia—
under which the request for MAiD is to be implemented.  This leaves open an awkward 
possibility: what is to be done if the later, incapacitated, person appears to decline or refuse what 
the earlier, competent person has requested?  
 Something like that scenario occurred in a recent case that made it all the way to the 
Dutch Supreme Court.61  The patient in the case is unnamed, but for ease of reference I am going 
to call her Ms. A.  In September 2012, at the age of seventy, Ms. A was diagnosed with 





My information about this case is drawn from (English translations of) three sources: 
(1) Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2016, 54–8: 
https://english.euthanasiecommissie.nl/the-committees/documents/publications/annual-
reports/2002/annual-reports/annual-reports; 




(3) the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court (21 April 2020) [henceforth: Supreme Court 2020]: 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:1338&showbutton=true&keyw
ord=euthanasia.  
The case has been much discussed in the bioethics and legal literature: see, for instance, Miller, Dresser 
and Kim 2019; Menzel 2019; Cohen-Almagor 2019; Asscher and van de Vathorst 2020; McMorrow 
2021.
which she stated that she wanted MAiD administered when she reached the point at which she 
was no longer able to live at home with her husband.  She also signed a power of attorney for 
medical decision-making in which she appointed her husband as her substitute decision-maker, 
and her daughter as backup.  In her written request she made it very clear that she did not want to 
be admitted to a nursing home.  Her mother, who had died of Alzheimer’s, had spent twelve 
years in such an institution, and Ms. A was adamant that she did not want this to happen to her.  
Her aunts, two brothers, and a sister had also all died of the same disease.  In January 2015 she 
reaffirmed her wishes in a second written request.  There is no doubt, based on the record, that on 
both occasions she was decisionally capable and her request met the condition of being voluntary 
and well-considered.
 So far, her advance requests score well on grounds of voluntariness, information, and 
specificity.  However, Ms. A also managed to cloud the issues a little.  In her first directive she 
asked that MAiD be performed when she is “still to some degree decisionally competent” and in 
her second “when I myself think the time is ripe”.  In the latter she also stated: “I trust that, by the 
time the quality of my life has become so poor, euthanasia will be performed at my request.”  
These phrases suggest that she expected to have some later role in deciding when the right time 
had come.  However, the point of writing the advance request was to register her wishes, while 
decisionally capable, for a later time when she would have lost capacity.  Once having lost 
capacity, she could not expect to be making a decision about when “the time is ripe”.  This 
evident confusion about the role of the advance request somewhat compromised it and, 
unsurprisingly, also complicated its later application.  However, it was clear from the beginning 
that Ms. A’s dominant wish was to be administered MAiD when she reached the stage of her 
dementia when she could no longer be cared for at home and had to be admitted to a nursing 
home. 
 Throughout the remainder of 2015, Ms. A’s condition deteriorated significantly.  She 
began to spend one day a week in the nursing home, in order to relieve the care burden on her 
husband, and then this gradually expanded to five days a week.  Finally, in March 2016 she was 
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admitted to the nursing home.  Upon admission, Ms. A’s husband discussed her advance MAiD 
request with the geriatric specialist who became responsible for her care.  This specialist then 
initiated the process of determining whether the due care criteria for MAiD could be met in Ms. 
A’s case.  She consulted with Ms. A’s general practitioner, her psychologist, her husband and 
daughter, a consultant from the ‘end-of-life’ clinic, and two physicians from SCEN (Support and 
Consultation for Euthanasia in the Netherlands): a psychiatrist and an internist.  The geriatric 
specialist and the consultants all agreed that the due care criteria were met.  In April 2016 the 
geriatric specialist administered MAiD to Ms. A, in the presence of her husband and daughter.
 Upon review, the Regional Euthanasia Review Committee found that the due care criteria 
had not all been met and in 2016 referred the case to the Public Prosecution Service, which 
initiated a prosecution (the first such prosecution since the 2002 law came into effect).62  In 
November 2019 the decision of the District Court of the Hague disagreed with the Review 
Committee, finding that all of the due care criteria had been complied with.  This decision was 
then affirmed in April 2020 by the Supreme Court.
 There are important points of contention in this case that require much fuller discussion.  
But before turning to them, we can set aside two issues that are not contested.  The first is that, 
by the time Ms. A entered the nursing home, she was severely demented and had become 
decisionally incapable.  This was agreed by every physician that examined her during that time, 
including the SCEN psychiatrist who was qualified to decide issues of capacity.  It was also 
agreed by the Review Committee and the courts.  This is important, since her admission to the 
nursing home satisfied the condition for MAiD recorded in her advance request, and her current 
incapacity meant that the request could now be acted on (assuming that the due care criteria 
could be satisfied).  
 The second issue is that, during her time in the nursing home, Ms. A was suffering 
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Committee’s finding and issued a warning to the specialist.
when, the patient’s suffering has become unbearable would be to ask the patient.  But for 
severely demented patients like Ms. A this may not be possible, in which case other means of 
assessment will be necessary.  The Regional Euthanasia Review Committees’ Euthanasia Code 
states that:  “The patient’s consciousness of his suffering may be apparent from what he says, or 
from his other utterances or physical reactions. It is the overall picture that matters.  In cases 
where a patient can no longer express his suffering in words, the physician must be alert to other 
signals that may reveal the patient’s burden of suffering”.63  The District Court summarized those 
“other signals” as follows:
It was observed that the patient during the larger part of the day showed signs of 
agitation, unrest, stress, anxiousness, sorrow, anger and panic. She cried a lot, often said 
that she found it horrible and that it was breaking her down and said every day (up to 20 
times a day) that she wanted to die.  Her day and night rhythm was disrupted and almost 
every day she wandered over the hallways, also at night.  She banged on the windows and 
doors until her hands hurt.  She accosted random people believing that they were 
acquaintances.  This often led to physical conflicts with fellow residents.  There was also 
a physical degradation of her person, by large dependency and incontinence.64    
As we saw earlier, all of the foregoing symptoms are common in late-stage Alzheimer’s.  The 
Review Committee and the courts all agreed that the due care criterion of unbearable suffering 
was met in Ms. A’s case.
 What was at issue in the case was a seeming conflict between Ms. A’s former wishes, as 
recorded in her advance requests, and her current wishes.  Having reached the point of admission 
to the nursing home, Ms. A had lost the capacity to understand both her own condition and what 
MAiD is.  However, when the latter was explained to her (“You will get a needle and then not 
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In principle, the 2002 law allows an advance written request for MAiD to substitute for a current 
oral request.  But can it so substitute if the patient is now not only not saying “yes” but is actually 
saying “no”?  In a situation like this, which is to take precedence: the patient’s prior capable 
request or her current incapable refusal?  That is the fundamental issue that the Review 
Committee and the courts had to contend with (and about which they disagreed).
 We are a long way from Dworkin’s Margo here, since by no stretch of the imagination 
was Ms. A happy and contented once in the nursing home.  Nor is it a conflict between critical 
and experiential interests, since all of Ms. A’s interests point in the same direction.  Instead, it is 
more like a clash of wills: the current incapacitated will v. the prior capable one.  The conflict 
was not made easier to resolve by Ms. A’s inclusion in her written requests of phrases like “when 
I myself think the time is ripe” or “at my request”, as though she was expecting to have final 
signoff on MAiD.  
 When MAiD was finally administered, Ms. A clearly had no understanding of what was 
happening.  In order to sedate her, the geriatric specialist dissolved midazolam in her coffee, 
because Ms. A was not taking any medication and would probably have refused to take the 
midazolam herself.  When it became clear that the sedative was not having a sufficient effect, a 
second dose was administered with a syringe.  Once Ms. A was unconscious, a cannula was 
inserted.  However, when the physician tried to administer the thiopental, Ms. A sat up.  Her 
family then held her and the physician quickly administered the remaining medication.   
  In light of the wording of Ms. A’s advance request, the Review Committee considered 
that “doubt persists as to whether the patient wanted the advance directive to take the place of an 
oral request” and therefore concluded: “In the absence of an oral request from the patient asking 
the physician to actually perform euthanasia and the absence of a clear advance directive to 
replace such a request, ... the physician could not have concluded unequivocally that she had 
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criterion had not been met.
 The District Court attached more weight to Ms. A’s subsequent incapacity and concluded 
that at that stage “she was ... no longer able to communicate her own will in a coherent way”.  
Therefore:
It is the opinion of the court that, in view of the state of profound dementia the patient 
was in, the accused did not have the obligation to obtain information from the patient 
about her present wish to live or to die.  This is a requirement, which is not laid down in 
the law. The specific situation of the incapacitated patient leads to the fact that an oral 
verification of his wish to live and his suffering is impossible.  Setting this requirement 
would be detrimental to the living will of the patient, which is specifically intended for 
the situation in which the person who drafted the living will ends up in a state of 
unbearable and hopeless suffering and is no longer able to express his will.66 
 The District Court’s judgement was referred to the Supreme Court for the purpose of 
gaining some clarity about the state of the law.  Contrary to the Review Committee, the Supreme 
Court interpreted Ms. A’s advance requests as implying that “the patient wanted to hand over 
control of the moment of euthanasia to a doctor upon admission” to the nursing home.  “With 
another interpretation, namely that the patient only wanted euthanasia as long as she could still 
determine that moment herself, her written advance directive would lose all meaning...”67  The 
court then agreed with the lower court’s decision:
The court is of the opinion that, given the deeply demented condition in which the patient 
was now, the [physician] was not obliged to inquire about a current life or death wish of 
the patient.  This sets a requirement that the law does not know.  The specific position of 
the incapacitated patient means that oral verification of his wish and his suffering is not 
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for the situation where the person who has issued the living will enters a situation of 
unbearable and hopeless suffering and is no longer able to express his will.68 
 The most important aspect of this decision for our purposes is its declaration that a person 
incapacitated by profound dementia is “no longer able to express his will” and that therefore 
“oral verification of his wish...is not possible”.69  In that case, present incapable wishes to live or 
die have no weight against prior capable ones.  The effect of the Supreme Court’s decision has 
therefore been to strengthen the authority of advance MAiD requests in the Netherlands, by 
determining that they can stand as a “voluntary and well-considered” request at the appropriate 
later time, in the absence of a wish to die, or even in the presence of a wish to live, at that later 
time.  In light of this decision, the Euthanasia Code of the Regional Euthanasia Review 
Committees has since been amended to state that, where a patient has advanced dementia, “it is 
not necessary for the doctor to agree with the patient the time or manner in which euthanasia will 
be given”.70  
 This clarification of the “voluntary and well-considered request” condition will not 
suffice by itself to justify administering MAiD to an incapacitated patient, since the other due 
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10. “Unbearable Suffering”
 In addition to patient autonomy, exemplified by the requirement of a voluntary and well-
considered request, the Dutch system places a great deal of emphasis on patient suffering.  The 
due care criteria require that the patient’s suffering, at the time at which MAiD is to be 
administered, must be “unbearable, with no prospect of improvement”.  As noted earlier, in the 
case of a capable patient the normal means of determining when suffering has become 
unbearable is to consult the patient.  As the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees put it:
It is sometimes hard to establish whether suffering is unbearable, for this is a subjective 
notion. What is bearable for one patient may be unbearable for another. This depends on 
the individual patient’s perception of his situation, his life history and medical history, 
personality, values and physical and mental stamina. It must be palpable to the physician, 
also in light of what has happened so far, that this particular patient’s suffering is 
unbearable. The physician must therefore not only be able to empathise with the patient’s 
situation, but also see it from the patient’s point of view.71
 This criterion of unbearable suffering is also meant to be applied mutatis mutandis to 
patients with advanced dementia.  But how is this meant to work with patients who no longer 
have a “point of view” on their own suffering, or with whom communication on this issue has 
become impossible?  In the survey of Dutch physicians, cited earlier, the main impediment 
mentioned by the respondents to administering MAiD to deeply demented patients was the 
impossibility of communicating with these patients, thus the difficulty of determining whether 
their suffering was unbearable.72  As we saw earlier in the case of Ms. A, the Review 
Committees state that “in cases where a patient can no longer express his suffering in words, the 
physician must be alert to other signals that may reveal the patient’s burden of suffering”.73  
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Review Committee that examined it, and both of the courts to agree that her suffering was indeed 
unbearable.  But what is to be done if there are no such signals?
 This problem was central to the case of a woman I will call Ms. B.74  On three occasions 
from 1992 to 1994 (well in advance of the euthanasia law), Ms. B signed advance requests for 
MAiD to be administered in the event of early dementia, dependence on others, or permanent 
admission to a nursing home.  Unlike the advance request of Ms. A, these documents were not 
complicated by any suggestion that she expected to have a say in the matter if/when any of these 
conditions were satisfied.  Ms. B also appointed both of her children as her substitute decision-
makers.  In 2012 she suffered a stroke but recovered quickly and was able to return home.  At 
that time she was informed by her general practitioner that admission to a nursing home might be 
necessary in case of a second stroke.  Six months later she suffered a second stroke, which left 
her with aphasia, cognitive impairment, mobility problems, and seizures.  She was then admitted 
to a nursing home.  Since her condition was considered incurable, treatment in the nursing home 
was palliative only.  Subsequent to her admission, her children asked a physician from the end-
of-life clinic to administer MAiD, pursuant to Ms. B’s advance request.  In August 2012 the 
physician did so.  Ms. B was eighty to ninety years old at the time.
 Two things are clear in this case.  The first is that Ms. B was fully decisionally capable in 
1992 to 1994 when she wrote her advance MAiD requests.  Although she never subsequently 
updated or rewrote them, she did discuss the issue on a number of occasions with her general 
practitioner.  Her children also confirmed that her request remained current prior to her second 
stroke.  The second is that Ms. B was decisionally incapable following the second stroke, when 
her aphasia and cognitive impairment made communication with her impossible.  Since, unlike 
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Review Committee that examined the case concluded that her advance request constituted a 
voluntary and well-considered request for MAiD, satisfying that due care criterion.       
 That left the issue of unbearable suffering.  Once in the nursing home, Ms. B was utterly 
unable to express verbally whether she was suffering and, if so, whether she found her suffering 
unbearable.  However, unlike the case of Ms. A, the “other signals that may reveal the patient’s 
burden of suffering” were also largely absent.  Though Ms. B was subject to mood swings, and 
could occasionally be aggressive, in general she was calm and friendly.  The consultant who was 
called in on the case claimed to find signs of despair, frustration, and desolation in Ms. B’s eyes, 
and reported that the patient had clearly indicated, both verbally and non-verbally, that she did 
not want to be in her current situation.  The Review Committee, however, was unconvinced that 
these indications were sufficient to establish unbearable suffering.  
 By contrast, the physician from the end-of-life clinic, who administered MAiD, claimed 
not to observe any signs of occurrent suffering in Ms. B.  Instead, he took the view that Ms. B’s 
unbearable suffering consisted in the fact that she now found herself in the very situation—
permanent admission to a nursing home— that she had indicated in her advance request would 
be intolerable to her.  Here then was the crucial issue: were the terms of that advance request 
sufficient to conclude that Ms. B was now suffering unbearably, or did there now need to be 
additional behavioural evidence of her suffering?  The Review Committee’s ruling was that “the 
mere fact that the patient has had to leave her own environment permanently and was admitted to 
a nursing home is insufficient to assume the agony of her suffering”, despite the terms of her 
advance request.  The Committee therefore found that the due care criterion of unbearable 
suffering had not been met.  The case was referred to the Public Prosecution Service, but, as far 
as I have been able to ascertain, no prosecution was subsequently initiated.
11. Two Lessons from the Netherlands
 Ms. A was found to be suffering unbearably at the time at which MAiD was 
administered, but in light of some of her current statements the question was whether her 
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advance directive still stood as a voluntary and well-considered request.  Ms. B’s advance 
request was found to be still perfectly valid, with no contraindications, but in light of her current 
condition the question was whether she was now suffering.  The two cases between them put 
pressure on the Netherlands’ two most important criteria of due care.75  So what lessons might 
we take away from them for a possible regime in Canada?
 To simplify matters, I will assume that we are dealing with a case of a decisionally 
capable patient who has made a voluntary and fully informed advance request that MAiD be 
administered under carefully specified conditions in the event of later incapacity due to profound 
dementia, and that those conditions now obtain.76  The Dutch cases raise important questions 
both about the current authority of the advance consent and about the requirement that the patient 
now be suffering.  I will consider these in turn.
Consent.  The Dutch courts (but not the Review Committee) found that Ms. A’s expressions of a 
wish to live, or not to die yet, could be disregarded since, in her profound dementia, she was “no 
longer capable of expressing her will”.  By that they seem to have meant that, because at this 
point she was no longer capable of understanding what administering MAiD would mean, she 
was therefore incapable of revoking or overriding her prior request for it. This raises a very 
important question.  As we saw earlier, valid consent to treatment presupposes (among other 
conditions) a voluntary and fully informed decision by a capable subject.  In their decisions in 
this case, the Dutch courts have effectively imposed these same validity conditions on refusal of 
treatment.  Because Ms. A was incapacitated and could not be informed about MAiD, and 
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effect.  The courts have therefore effectively treated consent and refusal symmetrically, with the 
same validity conditions in both cases.  But were they right to do so? 
 It is certainly possible to see why the courts took this position.  In their eyes, they were 
protecting the integrity of advance requests made by decisionally capable persons: requiring the 
physician to inquire about the current wishes of the later deeply demented person “would 
undermine the living will, which is precisely intended for the situation where the person who has 
issued the living will ... is no longer able to express his will.”  And the courts have a point, if (as 
I argued earlier) the main purpose of advance requests for MAiD—indeed of advance directives 
in general and of the whole edifice of informed consent—is to ensure the effective exercise of 
patient autonomy over personal health care decisions.  If I autonomously specify the conditions 
under which I wish MAiD to be administered in the event of my later incapacity due to late-stage 
dementia, and I now find myself in those conditions, then my autonomous will is being thwarted 
if my request is not implemented.  To refuse to proceed because my later demented self says that 
I don’t (yet) want to die is not to favour my present autonomy over my prior autonomy, because I 
now have no autonomy.  Instead, as the courts have put it, it has the effect of undermining the 
whole rationale for allowing advance requests in the first place.  
 The same issue of consent was central to a Canadian case, where, however, it concerned 
not MAiD but SED by AD.77  In 1991 Margot Bentley executed an advance directive that stated: 
“If at such a time the situation should arise that there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery 
from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive 
by artificial means or heroic measures”.  She also listed specific instructions, including “no 
nourishment or liquids” and designated her husband and daughter as her SDMs.  In 1999, Ms. 
Bentley was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and by 2005 her condition had deteriorated to 
the point that she needed to be moved to a residential care facility. In 2013, she was diagnosed 
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responded to her family and had lost all verbal abilities and basic motor skills.  Her days were 
spent either motionless in bed or slumped in a wheelchair with her eyes closed.  To survive, she 
required spoon-feeding by care-givers.  The staff at the care facility assisted her with eating and 
drinking by placing a spoon or glass on her lower lip.  When she opened her mouth to accept 
food or fluids, the care attendant placed it in her mouth and Ms. Bentley swallowed it. When she 
kept her mouth closed despite being prompted, the care attendant would try again.  If she 
continued to keep her mouth closed despite a couple of attempts, the care attendant would make 
no attempt to force her to accept either food or fluids. 
 Ms. Bentley’s family wanted to honour her advance directive and therefore requested that 
the care facility stop providing her with food and fluids.  When the facility refused to do so, Ms. 
Bentley’s husband and daughter petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia for 
declaratory relief that would prohibit the facility from providing Ms. Bentley with oral nutrition 
and hydration.  In its 2014 decision the Court denied that relief.  As in the case of Ms. A, it found 
some ambiguities in Ms. Bentley’s advance directive: specifically, whether she meant to refuse 
oral feeding, as a matter of personal care, rather than administration of nutrition and hydration as 
a part of health care.  But more importantly, and somewhat surprisingly, it ruled that Ms. 
Bentley’s sometimes acceptance of food and fluids, by opening her mouth and swallowing, 
constituted valid consent to assisted feeding, despite her severely demented condition.  Relying 
on this finding of fact by the trial judge, in 2015 the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld 
the lower court decision.  Ms. Bentley remained in the care facility, where she died in November 
2016.
 The parallels between Ms. A and Ms. Bentley are clear, despite the fact that the former 
was (at least apparently) registering an advance request for MAiD in the event of incapacity, 
while the latter was (at least apparently) registering an advance refusal of oral feeding in the 
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event of incapacity.78  Both women eventually reached a stage of severe dementia and both were, 
by all reasonable standards, decisionally incapable.  At that stage each woman was displaying 
behaviour that could be construed as overriding their prior, pre-dementia wishes: Ms. A by 
rejecting MAiD and Ms. Bentley by accepting oral feeding.  The question in each case was 
whether the behaviour in question constituted valid refusal/consent.  The Dutch courts ruled that 
Ms. A’s ‘refusal’ was invalid, seemingly because it failed to live up to the normal standards for 
valid consent, while the Canadian courts reached the opposite conclusion about Ms. Bentley’s 
‘consent’, despite the fact that it too fell well short of those standards.79  The Dutch courts 
privileged Ms. A’s earlier competent wishes over her later incompetent behaviour, while the 
Canadian courts did the opposite.  
Suffering.  The Dutch criterion of unbearable suffering finds its echo in the Canadian law that 
requires a patient to have “a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability ... that causes them 
enduring physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be 
relieved under conditions that they consider acceptable”.80  The question raised by the case of 
Ms. B is how to adapt that condition to accommodate advance requests in anticipation of severe 
dementia.  What the Dutch have effectively done is to keep the suffering criterion in place, by 
requiring evidence of current distress on the part of the demented patient.  While this may make 
sense in the context of the Dutch MAiD legislation, it does result in serious anomalies. 
 In order to satisfy the due care criterion of unbearable suffering, the patient must retain 
some level of consciousness; in the Netherlands, therefore, unlike Belgium, MAiD cannot be 
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indefensible.  Implementing advance MAiD requests for PVS patients is a much simpler matter 
than it is for dementia patients, since the former have no possibility of indicating dissent and no 
occurrent experiential interests that could serve as a contraindication.  Once a jurisdiction is 
willing to take the step of allowing advance requests in anticipation of severe dementia, it would 
be perverse of it not to do the same for permanent unconsciousness.
 Since a PVS patient is incapable of suffering, a requirement of current intolerable 
suffering is not a good fit for all cases of advance MAiD requests.  It should be sufficient in those 
cases that the state that the patient is currently in is the very one for which they requested MAiD 
in an advance directive.  But then the same point can be made for dementia cases.  Suppose, like 
Dworkin’s Margo, that what you are attempting to avoid, by writing your advance MAiD request, 
is not later suffering while demented but just being in a demented condition.  It is easy, I think, to 
understand how some people (not everyone) could consider such a condition intolerable, as an 
affront to their dignity.  Requiring them additionally to be suffering while in that condition 
would, once again, thwart their autonomous will.
 The two lessons from the Netherlands have a common theme: How much authority 
should be given to (capable) advance requests over later (incapable) behaviour, whether the latter 
consists in declarations of a wish to live or the complete absence of experiential suffering?  
 
12. Advance Requests for MAiD: Practicalities
 Since there is a strong ethical case in favour of advance requests, there is also a strong 
incentive to find a way of accommodating them within the existing legislative framework for 
MAiD in Canada.   In order to see how this might be done, it will be helpful to return to the 
doctrine of informed consent (section 1).  To borrow a phrase from the Dutch, its four conditions 
for valid consent to treatment will have to be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to accommodate 
advance requests.
Capacity.  Questions of capacity will arise at two junctures: the time of the initial request and the 
time of its potential implementation.  At both junctures advance MAiD requests introduce no 
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issues not already encountered for other advance directives, especially those that refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, or personal care, in the event of incapacity.  This does not mean, 
however, that no safeguards are called for.  Advance directives of all kinds are meant to be drawn 
up while the person still has capacity.  Decisional capacity for an advance MAiD request is quite 
specific: it is the ability to make a reasoned decision concerning this treatment under these later 
conditions.  In most cases determining capacity at the time of request will be straightforward, but 
there may sometimes be room for doubt, especially where the person is already in the early stages 
of dementia.  In cases of doubt, recourse can be had either to one of the widely used scales for 
tracking the progressive stages of dementia82, or to a specialist who is qualified to determine 
capacity.  
 An advance request for MAiD will stipulate the conditions under which it is to be 
implemented (more on this below).  But implementation cannot occur until the patient has 
reached a state of incapacity.  For many patients in late-stage Alzheimer’s there may be little 
doubt that this state has been reached.  But it is important to have certainty.  The same scales 
mentioned above will, of course, serve here as well, but it may also be worthwhile to borrow a 
practice from the Dutch, where incapacity can be determined only by an appropriately qualified 
independent specialist consulting on the case.  This specialist could also serve as the second 
practitioner required by the MAiD law to determine that the criteria for MAiD have been 
satisfied.  
 Doubts about capacity may arise as well in cases of loss of consciousness.  ‘PVS’ is 
often, perhaps usually, taken to be the abbreviation of persistent vegetative state.  But the 
condition is designated ‘persistent’ when it has lasted for one month after initial brain damage, 
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disorders of consciousness can be challenging to diagnose with certainty, in this case as well it 
would be appropriate to seek an opinion from a qualified specialist that the patient’s loss of 
consciousness—and therefore of capacity—is indeed permanent and irreversible.84 
 In the case of both conditions, if there is reasonable doubt about loss of capacity then 
implementation of the advance request must not go forward.   
Consent.  Explicit consent for MAiD will be given by the advance request itself.  In the case of 
advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment, there is often room for doubt in determining 
precisely which treatment modalities the person has expressed a wish to decline (this was very 
much a factor in the case of Margot Bentley).  However, where MAiD is concerned this should 
not be a problem, since the procedure being requested is quite specific.  That should settle the 
question of what is being requested.  However, it is also crucial that the request be specific about 
when it is to be implemented, i.e., the conditions under which MAiD is to be administered.  Any 
uncertainty or ambiguity on this issue will leave both providers and SDMs (and possibly courts 
as well) in an unenviable position.  
 The importance of clarity on this point became clear in the case of Ms A.  Her advance 
request stipulated that she wished MAiD to be administered when her dementia had reached the 
stage where she needed to be admitted to a nursing home.  While that threshold was clearly 
defined, and seemed to be based on the assumption that by that point she would have lost 
capacity, Ms. A also asked that MAiD be performed when she is “still to some degree 
decisionally competent” and “when I myself think the time is ripe”, suggesting that even after 
admission to the nursing home she expected to retain at least some degree of decisional capacity.  
The seeming contradiction in her advance request concerning the implementation conditions for 
MAiD was one of the factors that made her case so complicated.
 A person writing an advance request in anticipation of PVS will have no difficulty in 





Unless the patient has stipulated in their advance request that they wish MAiD to be administered in the 
event of unconsciousness for a specified period (such as a year).  I owe this point to Jocelyn Downie.
diagnosed as permanent.  Progressive dementia, however, is a much messier affair, and here it 
becomes important to stipulate implementation conditions as fully as possible, so that both 
providers and SDMs will be able to determine when the threshold has been crossed.  Everyone 
gets to define their own limits, but they need to define them clearly.  That threshold might come 
when the patient is no longer able to consistently recognize close family members, when they 
have become permanently bedridden or incontinent, when they have begun to experience 
frequent bouts of crying or rage or violence, when they can no longer speak in sentences, when 
they are suffering from pain or shortness of breath, or any combination of the foregoing.  One  
option available in defining a threshold is to utilize one of the objective scales of disease 
progression: one might say, for instance, “When I reach Stage 7 on the FAST Scale”.85   It would 
also be useful for health care organizations, advocacy groups, or the government to provide 
model advance request documents, in which the necessary information would be solicited.86  
Persons contemplating executing an advance request may also benefit from counselling or 
professional assistance.  It is equally important that the person appointed as proxy be fully 
briefed on the conditions of life that have been determined in advance to be intolerable.  The task 
of writing an advance request that will offer clear guidance to providers and SDMs is not a 
simple one.  But it is certainly not more difficult, and is in some respects easier, than providing 
similarly clear guidance for the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 
 It is a standard feature of advance care planning that, having once given consent to 
treatment, a capable person may withdraw that consent at any time.  Where PVS is concerned, 
this cannot happen after onset of the condition.  But once again dementia cases may be much 
more fraught.  What are we to do in cases like that of Ms. A, where the patient has continually 





See n. 82, above.
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Such models already exist for advance refusals of treatment; see, e.g., 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a0128cf8fd4d22ca11a405d/t/5f9202eee780d71b5005366d/160340
4559093/dementia-directive.pdf.  Last accessed 06/03/21.  They could be readily adapted to advance 
requests for MAiD.
resistance to, the procedure when incapable?  As we saw earlier, the Dutch courts have taken the 
position that the validity conditions for later refusal are the same as those for earlier consent, so 
that refusal of previously requested treatment by an incapable person need not be an obstacle to 
administering it, while the Canadian courts have adopted a remarkably low bar for valid consent 
to feeding for someone who has written an advance directive refusing food and water.  So far at 
least, the Canadian government appears to be taking the latter approach.  The limited provision 
for advance MAiD requests in Bill C-7 includes the stipulation that “the person does not 
demonstrate, by words, sounds, or gestures, refusal to have [MAiD] administered or resistance to 
its administration”.87  
 If this same stipulation were to be applied to expanded provisions for advance requests, 
then the remaining question would be whether persons determined not to have their precedent 
autonomy thwarted by their own later demented selves might be able to write their advance 
request as a ‘Ulysses pact’,88 under whose terms MAiD is to be administered in the event of 
incapacity even in the face of refusal or resistance.
Voluntariness.  As in the case of contemporaneous consent, the patient’s giving of advance 
consent to MAiD must be free of undue influence and coercion, whether by providers or by 
family or friends.  Special attention may need to be paid to persons with disabilities, in order to 
ensure that their advance request/refusal is not made in anticipation of lack of appropriate care 
following loss of capacity.  But it would be invidious to assume that having a disability, even a 






Bill C-7, s. 241.2(3.2)(c).  S. (3.3) adds the following: “For greater certainty, involuntary words, sounds 
or gestures made in response to contact do not constitute a demonstration of refusal or resistance for the 
purposes of paragraph (3.2)(c).”  
88
The term refers to the story of Ulysses (Odysseus) in Homer’s Odyssey, who wished to hear the Sirens’ 
song, though he knew that doing so would drive him temporarily mad.  He stopped his men’s ears with 
wax and ordered them to bind him to the mast and to disobey any later orders to set him free or to sail 




Information.  Along with vagueness or ambiguity, deficits of information are one of the main 
problems that critics find with advance directives.  However, there is no reason to think that 
advance requests for MAiD will be particularly susceptible to this problem.  The nature and 
prospects of PVS are well understood, while Alzheimer’s is a well-known and highly publicized 
disorder, with a well-defined progression of symptoms from early to late stage.  The timing will 
vary with individuals, the disease progressing more quickly with some than others, but not the 
nature of its assault.  Thus it is reasonable to expect an advance MAiD request with Alzheimer’s 
in mind to be well informed about what life will be like in the later stages of the disease.  
Furthermore, because the disease progresses gradually, rather than in sudden onslaughts, a 
patient will also have a good deal of time to reconsider and (if a change of heart occurs) revoke 
the request, before losing the capacity to do so.90  
 An advance request is especially likely to be well informed if it is drawn up after 
diagnosis with dementia.  That brings us to an important issue.  As noted at the outset, advance 
MAiD requests are often sorted into three categories: (a) after approval for MAiD but before 
administration, (b) after diagnosis of a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” but prior 
to approval, and (c) prior to diagnosis.91  The terms of Bill C-7 allow requests of type (a), but 
only for patients whose natural death is “reasonably foreseeable”.  That leaves types (b) and (c), 
and the question whether there is a significant difference between them.
 This question has an analogue in another of the residual issues that the 2016 MAiD law 
left for future consideration: whether MAiD should be accessible to ‘mature minors’.  The 
current law restricts access to persons 18 years of age and over.  That age limit was presumably 
chosen because it was thought to be an indicator of maturity, thus of decisional capacity for end-
of-life decision-making.  If so, it is far from reliable.  Some 16- and 17-year-olds will have the 





The situation will be different for cases of incapacity resulting from sudden events, such as stroke or 
traumatic brain injury.
91
Expert Panel Working Group on Advance Requests for MAiD 2018, ch. 4.
What matters directly is capacity, with chronological age figuring only as a rough and imperfect 
measure of it, in which case we should go directly to what matters and use capacity and not age 
as an eligibility criterion for MAiD.92 Doing so would complicate the approval process for 
MAiD, since it would require capacity assessments for mature minors.  But to exclude otherwise 
eligible patients just because they have not yet celebrated their eighteenth birthday would be 
arbitrary and discriminatory (especially in light of the fact that mature minors already have the 
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
 So too in the present case.  Diagnosis of “a serious and incurable illness, disease or 
disability” is a very significant event which is likely to concentrate any patient’s mind on their 
end-of-life care.  But it is only a rough and imperfect indicator of what really matters in this case, 
which is informedness.  With diagnosis will come specific information not only about the disease 
in question but, more importantly, about the nature and timing of its likely future course with this 
patient.  So, other things equal, advance MAiD requests post-diagnosis are likely to be better 
informed than requests pre-diagnosis.  But other things are not always equal, and requests before 
diagnosis can be very well informed indeed.  Ms. A’s advance request was made shortly after her 
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s, but she was already well informed not only about the disease but also 
about her risk of falling prey to it.  Her mother had spent twelve years in an institution wasting 
away with Alzheimer’s, and the disease had already claimed her aunts and three of her siblings.  
Ms. A knew a lot about Alzheimer’s before she was diagnosed with it.  Had her advance request 
been made before diagnosis it would not have been significantly less informed.  Ms. B’s advance 
request was registered decades before her first stroke, but it too did not suffer from informational 
deficits.  Like chronological age for mature minors, time of diagnosis is just a surrogate for what 





There is some precedent for this approach in Belgium. (Sumner 2017, 80) 
adequately informed and not enforce an arbitrary distinction between those made pre- and post-
diagnosis.93
  The focus on time of diagnosis can also point to something else that is important in its 
own right: the elapsed time between the request and realization of the conditions for its 
implementation.  As we saw earlier, one of the worries about advance directives in general is that 
they can become obsolete, either because new factual information has become available or 
because the patient’s own values have changed.  In order to avoid this problem it would seem a 
good idea to borrow another practice from Belgium, where advance MAiD requests are required 
by law to be updated every five years and to be included in the patient’s medical record.  
Implementing this measure may require creating provincial registries for advance requests 
(currently only Quebec has such a registry), but that is a good idea in its own right.  The updating 
requirement would have the effect not only of ensuring that patients remain well informed about 
the relevant medical facts but also of giving them an opportunity to rethink their own values and 
preferences.  
 I conclude that there is good reason to think that the standard conditions for informed 
consent to treatment can be successfully adapted to advance requests for MAiD.  There is, 
however, one other issue of adaptation to be addressed.  Like the Dutch criteria of due care, the 
statutory eligibility criteria for MAiD will also have to be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the 
special circumstances of advance requests.  In the terms of the legislation as enacted in June 
2016:
(2)  A person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition only if they meet all of 
the following criteria:
(a)  they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;





In any case, advance MAiD requests in anticipation of PVS must necessarily be drawn up pre-
diagnosis.
(c)  that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical 
or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under 
conditions that they consider acceptable; and
(d)  their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their 
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the 
specific length of time that they have remaining.94
Patients with advanced dementia, or in a permanent vegetative state, easily qualify as having “a 
serious and incurable illness” and being “in an advanced state of irreversible decline in 
capability”.  The amendments in Bill C-7 partially removed the condition that “natural death has 
become reasonably foreseeable”.95  This leaves us with the condition of intolerable suffering.   
 Earlier we saw the difficulties the Dutch have encountered in applying their comparable 
due care criterion in the case of severely demented patients who are unable to communicate 
whether they find their suffering unbearable.  But we also saw that there is a deeper problem with 
the suffering criterion: it cannot be satisfied in the case of patients in a permanent vegetative 
state.  Since it would be absurd to allow requests for MAiD to be implemented for demented 
patients but not for irreversibly unconscious ones, the whole issue needs to be rethought.  The 
current Canadian criterion of intolerable suffering, which has its place for contemporaneous 
decision-making, cannot just be automatically copied forward for at least some cases of advance 
requests.  
 So how to fix this?  At least three options are available: 
1.  We could retain the criterion for dementia cases and apply it (as the Dutch do) by relying on 





C-14, s. 241.2 (2).
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But only partially.  Under the terms of C-7, patients requesting MAiD will be placed on one of two 
tracks, depending on whether they satisfy this condition.  Those whose natural death is deemed to be 
reasonably foreseeable will have access to a fast track that includes elimination of the mandatory 10-day 
waiting period imposed by the 2016 legislation and the possibility of registering an advance request (but 
only at the time of approval for MAiD).  Those who do not satisfy the condition can now be eligible for 
MAiD, but only under additional procedural safeguards, including a mandatory 90-day interval between 
assessment and administration, and with no possibility of advance requests.
where it is inapplicable.  This may give us the right answers for both categories of cases, but it 
seems annoyingly ad hoc.  
2.  We could drop the criterion for all cases of advance requests while retaining it for 
contemporaneous requests.  For patients incapacitated by either PVS or dementia, the mere fact 
that they now find themselves in the condition specified in their advance request would suffice 
for implementing the request, without any requirement of occurrent suffering.  
3.  We could retain the criterion for all advance requests while interpreting it as being satisfied 
when the patient finds themselves in the condition (whether it be PVS or advanced dementia) 
specified in their advance request. This was the position adopted by the physician who 
administered MAiD to Ms. B.  
 Options 2 and 3 would be similar in practice and either would be a good fit for PVS 
cases.  As between them, the third has the advantage of seeming less ad hoc, since intolerable 
suffering would remain an eligibility criterion for all cases in a revised MAiD law, though with a 
distinctive interpretation for advance requests.  However, for dementia patients both of these 
options would mean that MAiD could be administered, pursuant to the patient’s advance request, 
in the complete absence of any signals of occurrent suffering, or even if the patient seems, or 
indeed is, like Dworkin’s Margo, happy and contented.
 PVS cases create difficulties not just for the “intolerable suffering” criterion but for the 
“reasonably foreseeable natural death” condition as well.  If we are to allow advance MAiD 
requests to be implemented in such cases (as we should), then this condition will have to be 
waived.  PVS patients can continue to live in their condition for years, as long as artificial 
hydration and nutrition are sustained.96  In such cases the patient’s natural death could not be 
deemed to be reasonably foreseeable.  But in this case the fix is easy.  This condition for access 





Nancy Cruzan, the central figure in the landmark U.S. case concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from a PVS patient, lapsed into her condition in 1983 and died in 1990 when her feeding tube 
was removed.
rationale.97  It is time to go beyond the half-hearted reforms of Bill C-7 and abolish the 
requirement entirely, for advance requests and for contemporaneous decision-making as well.
13. Conclusions  
 To recapitulate:  It is universally recognized that informed consent to treatment is an 
indispensable device for protecting both patient autonomy and patient well-being.  Advance care 
planning, including the use of advance directives, is its logical extension over time, allowing 
persons, while capable, to direct their care in the event of later incapacity.  Advance directives 
enable persons to elect, or refuse, treatment while incapacitated.  Advance requests for MAiD are 
a special case of advance directives, requesting a particular treatment under specified conditions.  
The goals and values served by informed consent are equally served by advance treatment 
directives, including advance MAiD requests.  In particular, there is no ethical difference 
between advance MAiD requests and at least some advance directives refusing life-sustaining 
treatment.
 The only remaining question, therefore, is practical: how to integrate advance MAiD 
requests into Canada’s existing regime for MAiD.  In the foregoing I have urged five changes to 
the current MAiD legislation, each of them more extensive than the limited amendments in Bill 
C-7:
 The legislation must be further amended to allow for advance requests for MAiD, 
including requests made in anticipation of incapacity due either to permanent 
unconsciousness or to advanced dementia.
 The amendment must not distinguish between requests made before and after diagnosis 





Truchon v. Attorney General of Canada, 2019 QCCS 3792 (CanLII), http://canlii.ca/t/j2bzl.  The 
difficulties inherent in interpreting the “reasonable foreseeability” condition are thoroughly explored in 
McMorrow, et al. 2020.
 The amendment will need to modify the current requirement of intolerable suffering so as 
to allow MAiD to be administered to persons in a state of permanent unconsciousness.  In 
so doing it must also clarify what constitutes intolerable suffering for persons with 
advanced dementia.
 The amendment will also need to clarify whether any sign of resistance to, or refusal of, 
MAiD by an incapacitated person negates that person’s prior competent request for 
MAiD.
 The requirement that the patient’s natural death be “reasonably foreseeable” must be 
entirely eliminated. 
 Ideally, the terms and conditions of revised legislation should be neither under- nor over-
inclusive.  They would be under-inclusive if they arbitrarily disallowed entire categories of cases, 
such as patients in a permanent vegetative state or those whose requests were drawn up prior to 
diagnosis.  These faults are easily avoided or corrected.  They would be over-inclusive if they 
were susceptible to abuse or misapplication.  These problems will arise either at the front end, 
when the request is drawn up, or the back end, when it is to be implemented.  At various points I 
have suggested best practices and safeguards designed to protect against both abuses and 
mistakes: careful specification of the circumstances under which the request is to be 
implemented, competency assessments where either capacity or incapacity is subject to doubt, 
consultation with specialists in the disease condition in question, the development of model 
request forms, and registration and periodic renewal of written requests to ensure that they 
remain up to date.  Better minds than mine will doubtless be able to come up with other ideas.  
 However carefully it is crafted, a legal regime that incorporates advance MAiD requests 
can be expected to yield hard cases, in which it will simply be unclear whether MAiD should or 
should not be administered.  Anyone who doubts this should reread sections 8-11, above, 
tracking the experience of the Netherlands.  Hard cases can be minimized by carefully drawn 
eligibility criteria and procedural safeguards, but they cannot be eliminated.  The only way to 
eliminate them is to prohibit advance MAiD requests entirely.  Absolute prohibitions of this sort 
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are the lazy person’s solution to the problem of hard cases.  In this instance, such a prohibition 
would sacrifice all of the benefits of advance MAiD requests in the vast majority of easy cases in 
order to avoid the burdens of difficult decisions in the small minority of hard cases.  For what it 
is worth, the Canadian courts have shown themselves reluctant to endorse blanket prohibitions, 
finding that they tend to suffer from the fatal flaw of over-breadth.  This was the primary basis of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter to strike down the absolute prohibition of MAiD in 
favour of a more nuanced and selective approach with appropriate safeguards.98  It is important 
not to make the same mistake where advance MAiD requests are concerned.  The inevitable 
minority of hard cases will be best dealt with, not by trying to prevent them from occurring in the 
first place, but by dealing with them on a case-by-case basis, bringing to bear the considerable 
resources provided by substitute decision-makers, assessors, and providers.  If all else fails (it 
shouldn’t), the courts will always be there as backup.       
 In pursuit of the goal of avoiding hard cases, or preventing abuses or mistakes, we must 
be careful not to erect such high fences around advance requests for MAiD that only a fortunate 
few will be able to surmount them (this would be under-inclusion again).  In this matter, as in so 
many, we need to find the balance between minimizing risk and ensuring effective access.  That 
is the continuing theme in Canadian MAiD legislation, which remains a work in progress.  Bill 
C-14 was a first step, going no farther than required by the Carter decision (and in some respects 
not as far).  The amendments in Bill C-7 constituted a small second step.  However, as the 
government recognizes, there are further issues to confront and further changes that will need to 





Carter 2015, at paras 114-121.
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